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the provisions of the Public Utilities Act
as all facilities for the production, generation, transmission, delivery, underground
storage, or furnishing of natural or manufactured gas except propane. As amended
May 26, this bill, notwithstanding the provision summarized above or any other
provision of law, would require the PUC
to assume, no later than July 1, 1994,
regulatory jurisdiction over the safety of
propane pipeline systems, including inspection and enforcement, for mobilehome
parks, condominiums and other multi-unit
residential housing, and shopping centers.
[13:2&3 CRLR 213] It would require the
PUC to establish a uniform billing surcharge designed to cover the PUC's cost
in implementing these provisions, with all
surcharge fees to be deposited by the PUC
in the Public Utilities Commission Utilities Reimbursement Account in the general fund, to be used, upon appropriation
by the legislature, for these purposes. [S.
E&PU]
AB 173 (V. Brown), as amended August 30, would limit the amount of salary
paid to the President and each member of
the PUC, on or after July 1, 1994, to an
amount no greater than the annual salary
of members of the legislature, excluding
the Speaker of the Assembly, President
pro Tempore of the Senate, Assembly majority and minority floor leaders, and Senate majority and minority floor leaders. [S.
Inactive File]
*
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he State Bar of California was created
by legislative act in 1927 and codified
in the California Constitution at Article
VI, section 9. The State Bar was established as a public corporation within the
judicial branch of government, and membership is a requirement for all attorneys
practicing law in California. Today, the

State Bar has over 137,000 members,
which equals approximately 17% of the
nation's population of lawyers.
The State Bar Act, Business and Professions Code section 6000 et seq., designates a Board of Governors to run the State
Bar. The Board President is elected by the
Board of Governors at its June meeting
and serves a one-year term beginning in
September. Only governors who have
served on the Board for three years are
eligible to run for President.
The Board consists of 23 membersseventeen licensed attorneys and six nonlawyer public members. Of the attorneys,
sixteen of them-including the Presidentare elected to the Board by lawyers in nine
geographic districts. A representative of the
California Young Lawyers Association
(CYLA), appointed by that organization's
Board of Directors, also sits on the Board.
The six public members are variously selected by the Governor, Assembly Speaker,
and Senate Rules Committee, and confirmed by the state Senate. Each Board
member serves a three-year term, except for
the CYLA representative (who serves for
one year) and the Board President (who
serves a fourth year when elected to the
presidency). The terms are staggered to provide for the selection of five attorneys and
two public members each year.
The State Bar includes twenty standing
committees; fourteen special committees,
addressing specific issues; sixteen sections covering fourteen substantive areas
of law; Bar service programs; and the
Conference of Delegates, which gives a
representative voice to 291 local, ethnic,
and specialty bar associations statewide.
The State Bar and its subdivisions perform a myriad of functions which fall into
six major categories: (1) testing State Bar
applicants and accrediting law schools;
(2) enforcing the State Bar Act and the
Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct,
which are codified at section 6076 of the
Business and Professions Code, and promoting competence-based education; (3)
ensuring the delivery of and access to legal
services; (4) educating the public; (5) improving the administration of justice; and
(6) providing member services.
Almost 75% of the Bar's annual $56
million budget is spent on its new attorney
discipline system. The system includes the
first full-time professional court for attorney discipline in the nation and a large
staff of investigators and prosecutors. The
Bar recommends sanctions to the California Supreme Court, which makes final
discipline decisions. However, Business
and Professions Code section 6007 authorizes the Bar to place attorneys on involuntary inactive status if they pose a sub-

stantial threat of harm to clients or to the
public, among other reasons.
In mid-December, the Bar relocated its
Los Angeles staff to the Transamerica
Center at 1149 S. Hill Street. Nearly 400
State Bar employees from three separate
Los Angeles locations were consolidated
at the new location; the Bar now occupies
seven floors of the building, and increased
its floor space by 25,000 square feet in the
move.

*MAJOR

PROJECTS

Board Maintains Secret Ballot Policy. After a lengthy and sometimes heated
debate at its December meeting, the Board
of Governors voted 12-8 to maintain the
secret ballot it uses to annually elect its
president. The issue of the secret ballot has
surfaced frequently in recent years, but
prior boards have affirmed the policy
based on "collegiality" concerns ("a secret
ballot fosters collegiality because it removes the discomfort of board members
having to vote publicly against those with
whom they have a close relationship").
This year, the Board's own Legal Committee urged it to abandon the secret vote
in favor of "the Board's overriding responsibility...to be accountable." The
Committee's analysis of the issue recognized that "[t]he Bar is both a regulatory
agency, accountable to the public; and an
organization representing the interests of
lawyers, accountable to those lawyers ....How does the State Bar show its
accountability as to the election of its leaders if the Board maintains a secret ballot?
The answer is simple: the secret ballot
affords no accountability whatsoever."
The Committee argued that the secret
ballot system fosters a lack of respect for
the State Bar as an institution, among lawyers and the public at large-which the
Bar and the legal profession can ill afford
at the present time. [13:4 CRLR 213] As
to the "collegiality" argument, the Committee said: "The obvious response is that
the purpose in serving on the Board is not
to be comfortable, but rather to act as
leaders, and to make decisions-often difficult-for which Board members are accountable."
In retaining the secret ballot, the Board
of Governors rejected not only the recommendations of its own committee, but
those of four major metropolitan bar associations (from San Francisco, Los Angeles, Santa Clara, and Orange counties).
Several Board members who had argued
for opening the ballot hinted that the
legislature should take action to overrule
the Board's decision.
In other action affecting the selection
of its president, the Board voted to abolish

California Regulatory Law Reporter • Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 1994)

REGULATORY AGENCY ACTION
its prior practice of permitting absentee
ballots, but made it easier for Board members to attend the election by moving the
election to a Saturday.
First Progress Report of the Commission on the Future of the Legal Profession and the State Bar. On December
4, chair Patricia Phillips presented the
Board of Governors with the first progress
report of the Commission on the Future of
the Legal Profession and the State Bar.
The 30-member Commission has been divided into six subcommittees (Discipline,
Admissions and Competence, Administration of Justice Resources, Services To
and For Lawyers, Bar Structure and Organization, Trends in the Law, and Lawyers
and the Public and Professionalism), and
is currently in its information-gathering
and research phase. The Commission conducted four public hearings in late October in an effort to "identify trends and
driving forces," and is beginning what
Phillips called "the visioning process"
which will document the Commission's
visions of the legal profession in the next
quarter-century.
The Commission was originally intended to study the future role of the integrated State Bar in regulating the legal
profession, but has significantly broadened its scope such that Bar structure is
only one of many foci. [13:4 CRLR 21314] The Commission was also originally
unbudgeted, but spent $60,000 in Bar dues
from its creation in June to October 31.
Phillips estimated that the Commission
will spend $250,000 before its duties are
completed in December 1994.
Morrow Appoints Task Forces to
Improve Attorney-Client Relations,
Evaluate Bar's New Discipline System.
During the fall, Bar President Margaret
Morrow appointed the members of two
important task forces whose creation she
announced shortly after her election. First,
Morrow named several members of the
Board of Governors to a new Client Relations Task Force, whose purpose is to develop ways to improve attorney client
communication and minimize misunder,standings which lead to client dissatisfaction, complaints to the Bar's disciplinary
system, and the poor public image of the
legal profession. The Task Force, which is
chaired by Board member Susan Troy,
includes members Joseph Bergeron,
Wendy Borcherdt, Michael Case, Maurice
Evans, Donald Fischbach, and James
Towery. The Task Force is working toward establishing a pilot program for mediation of attorney-client disputes, a lawyer education program emphasizing the
impact of good client relations in a successful practice (which may possibly be-

come required as part of lawyers' minimum continuing legal education obligations), and a public outreach program
highlighting the client's role in the attorney-client relationship. The public outreach program may take the form of volunteer attorneys speaking at meetings of
community social clubs (such as the
Kiwanis, Elks, Rotary, and Optimists
clubs) to disseminate information to the
public regarding their rights and responsibilities when hiring an attorney, and aspects of an attorney's code of ethics.
Second, Morrow appointed eleven
members to a "blue-ribbon" committee
which will conduct a review of the Bar's
four-year-old revamped discipline system. [13:4 CRLR 214] Retired U.S. Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Arthur L.
Alarcon chairs the committee, which
began work immediately and is scheduled
to conclude the review by September
1994. Other committee members include
Aviva K. Bobb, a former presiding judge
of the Los Angeles Municipal Court; Robert C. Bonner, a partner in the Los Angeles
office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher; Cedric C. Chao, a partner with Morrison &
Foerster in San Francisco; Los Angeles
trial lawyer Johnnie L. Cochran Jr.; William S. Davila, president of Vons Companies and a public member on the Board of
Governors; Pamela S. Edwards, a partner
with KPMG Peat Marwick of Oakland;
Dennis B. Jones, executive officer of the
Sacramento Superior and Municipal
Courts; Virginia C. Nelson, a sole practitioner from San Diego and former president of the San Diego County Bar Association; Stuart K. Rappaport, public defender of Santa Clara County; and Charles
0. Schetter, a director in McKinsey &
Company, Inc. The discipline system review committee plans to hold public hearings in several locations throughout the
state in the spring of 1994.
State Bar Rulemaking. The following is a status update on proposed regulatory amendments considered by the State
Bar in recent months and described in
detail in previous issues of the Reporter:
* Attorney Advertising. At its October
meeting, the Board of Governors considered six proposed new attorney advertising standards under Rule of Professional
Conduct 1-400. Among other things, the
six standards (which were the subject of a
public comment period which ended in
June 1993) would prohibit (1) advertising
in the form of a trade or fictitious name
unless the ad also states the name and State
Bar number of the member who practices
law under such trade or fictitious name;
(2) advertising (except professional announcements) which does not state the
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name and State Bar number of the attorney
responsible for it; (3) the use of dramatizations in advertising, unless they include
a disclaimer stating "this is a dramatization"; (4) attorney advertising of "no fee"
contingency arrangements unless the ad
also specifies whether clients are liable for
the attorney's expenses in handling a case;
(5) advertising which states or implies that
legal services are available in a language
other than English unless the ad also states
the name and employment title of the person who speaks the language other than
English and discloses that such person is
not a State Bar member, if that is the case;
and (6) mailers (except for professional
announcements) that do not bear the word
"advertisement" or "newsletter" on every
page. [13:4 CRLR 215; 13:2&3 CRLR 219]
Due to opposition expressed by three major
private bar associations, the Board referred the standards back to the Committee on Admissions and Competence for
further revision.
At its December meeting, the Committee adopted amendments to the proposed
standards. Specifically, the Committee decided to delete standard (1) above regarding trade names, reasoning that it has been
substantively incorporated into revised
standard (2). The Committee revised standard (2), regarding the identification of the
name and State Bar number of at least one
attorney behind all advertising, to prohibit
"a 'communication,' except professional
announcements, in the form of an advertisement primarily directed to seeking
professional employment primarily for
pecuniary gain transmitted to the general
public or any substantial portion thereof
by mail or equivalent means or by means
of television, radio, newspaper, magazine
or other form of commercial mass media
which does not state the name of the member responsible for the communication."
The Committee slightly modified standard (3) regarding dramatizations to require attorneys who use them in advertising to state "this is a dramatization" or
words of similar import. The Committee
amended standard (5), the foreign language provision, to delete the disclosure
requirement (a) where the member can
personally provide legal services in the
advertised foreign language, and (b) regarding the name of the non-member who
speaks the foreign language. Finally, the
Committee slightly amended standard (6)
regarding mailers, to require them to bear
the word "advertisement" or "newsletter",
or words of similar import, on every page.
At this writing, the Bar does not intend
to republish the modified version of these
advertising standards for an additional
public comment period, and the Board of
17
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Governors is scheduled to consider them
at its April meeting.
On December 2, the public comment
period closed on two additional proposed
advertising standards published by the
Committee last August. One standard
would require attorneys who regularly solicit business through the mail to disclose
to the recipient where the attorney obtained his/her name. The other would require attorneys to charge no more than the
fee originally advertised; fees advertised
in telephone directories must be adhered
to for one year, and fees advertised elsewhere must be effective for90 days. [13:4
CRLR 215] At this writing, the Committee
is scheduled to discussed the comments
received on the proposed standards at its
January meeting.
* Gifts to Attorneys From Clients. At
its November meeting, the Board's Committee on Admissions and Competence
discussed the differences between AB 21
(Umberg) (Chapter 293, Statutes of 1993),
a portion of which (with certain exceptions) invalidates donative bequests made
in wills, trusts, and similar instruments to
the attorney who prepared the instrument,
and its proposed amendments to Rule of
Professional Conduct 4-400. [13:4 CRLR
217; 13:2&3 CRLR 220] The proposed
amendments to Rule 4-400 would prohibit
State Bar members from (1) inducing a
client to make a gift, including a testamentary gift, to the member or the member's
parent, child, sibling, or spouse, except
where the client is "related to" the member, and (2) preparing an instrument giving any gift from a client to the member or
the member's parent, child, sibling, or
spouse, except where the client is "related
to" the member. Committee staff noted
that AB 21 expands the universe of individuals who may not take under an instrument drafted by the attorney to include (I)
the attorney who drafted or transcribed, or
caused to be drafted or transcribed, such
instrument; (2) a cohabitant with such attorney; (3) certain relatives of such attorney by blood or marriage; or (4) certain
business associates of such attorney.
Following extensive discussion at its
November meeting and again at its December meeting, the Committee released
a modified version of Rule 4-400. As revised, the rule states that "[a] member
shall not: (A) induce a client to make any
gift, including a testamentary gift, to the
member or to a person related to the member; or (B) prepare an instrument giving
any gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, to the member or to a person
related to the member, except where the
client is related to the member or transferee." The Discussion section to the re-

vised rule states that a person "related to"
the member means the member's spouse
or predeceased spouse; relatives and
spouses of relatives within the third degree of the member, the member's spouse,
or predeceased spouse; cohabitants with
the member; partners or shareholders of
any partnership or corporation in which
any person described previously has a
10% or greater ownership interest, and
any employee of such person, partnership,
or corporation; and employees of the
member. A client "related to" the member
means the member's spouse or predeceased spouse, relatives and spouses of
relatives within the third degree of the
member, the member's spouse, or predeceased spouse; and cohabitants with the
member. A client "related to" the transferee means the transferee's spouse or predeceased spouse; relatives and spouses of
relatives within the third degree of the
transferee, the transferee's spouse or predeceased spouse; and cohabitants with the
transferee.
At this writing, the comment period on
the revised version of Rule 4-400 closes
on March 11.
- Employment of Disbarred, Suspended,or Inactive Lawyers. On October
18, the public comment period closed on
the proposal of the Committee on Admissions and Competence to adopt new Rule
1-311, which would prohibit a State Bar
member from employing a disbarred, suspended, or inactive status lawyer unless
(1) the activities of such employee do not
constitute the practice of law; (2) the employee has no direct contact with the clients of the member; and (3) the employee
does not receive, disburse, or otherwise
have any involvement with client trust
funds or property. At this writing, the
Committee is scheduled to consider the
comments at its January meeting.
- Deposit of Advance Fees in Trust
Account. In June 1992, the Board of Governors adopted amendments to Rules of
Professional Conduct 3-700 and 4-100, to
require that all advance fees paid by a
client to a State Bar member be placed in
the member's client trust account unless
the member's written fee agreement expressly provides that the fee paid in advance is earned when paid or is a "true
retainer" as that term is defined in Rule
3-700(D)(2). [12:4 CRLR 235] Although
the Bar submitted these rule changes to the
California Supreme Court in October
1992, the court has not yet approved them
at this writing.
- Use of the Term "Certified Specialist." On July 16, the public comment period closed on the Bar's proposal to adopt
a new version of Rule of Professional

Conduct 1-400(D)(6), which would prohibit a California attorney from advertising as a "certified specialist" unless the
attorney is certified by the Bar's Board of
Legal Specialization or by another entity
approved by the Bar to designate specialists. [13:1 CRLR 142] Bar staff is currently reviewing the comments received;
at this writing, this proposal has not been
scheduled on the Board of Governors'
agenda.
- Discrimination in Management of a
Law Practice. In July 1993, the Board of
Governors forwarded to the California Supreme Court proposed Rule 2-400, which
would provide that "in the management or
operation of a law practice a [State Bar]
member shall not unlawfully discriminate
or knowingly permit unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, national origin,
sex, sexual orientation, religion, age or
disability in: (I) hiring, promoting, discharging or otherwise determining the
conditions of employment of any person;
or (2) accepting or terminating representation of any client." [12:4 CRLR 235-36]
At this writing, the Court has yet to take
action on the proposed rule.
- Copies of Documents for Clients. In
September 1993, the Board of Governors
forwarded proposed new Rule of Professional Conduct 3-520, which would require attorneys to provide to a client, upon
request, one copy of any significant document or correspondence received or prepared by the attorney relating to the employment or representation, to the California Supreme Court for review and apprcval. [13:1 CRLR 142] At this writing,
the rule has not yet been approved by the
court.
M

LEGISLATION
Coalition Drops Proposed Ballot Initiative Limiting Contingency Fees. In
November, Californians for Fair Liability
Laws (CFLL), a coalition of business
groups headed by former Senator Barry
Keene, abandoned its efforts to place an
initiative on the November 1994 ballot
limiting attorney contingency fees to
$25,000 or less for the first $ 100,000 of an
award, and to an even lower percentage on
larger amounts. [13:4 CRLR 216] CFLL
dropped the effort after Farmers Group
Insurance Company, one of the major
backers of the initiative, withdrew its support. Farmers' withdrawal was reportedly
due to threats by the California Trial Lawyers Association to air a television commercial publicizing a recent $57 million
bad faith judgment against Farmers.
AB 1287 (Moore), as amended September 8, would, until January 1, 1997,
enact a comprehensive scheme for the
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identification, study, and regulation of nonlawyer providers (also called "legal technicians" or "independent paralegals") under
the jurisdiction of the Department of Consumer Affairs. The Bar has consistently opposed Assemblymember Moore's attempts
to create a registration program to certify
non-lawyer "legal technicians" to practice in
underserved areas of law such as landlordtenant, immigration, and consumer law.
Several years ago, the Board of Governors
opposed a full-blown registration program
requiring training, testing, retesting, and
limited areas of practice. [11:4 CRLR 21112] Since then, the bill has been watered
down by its sponsors in an attempt to secure
Bar neutrality, but the Bar now opposes the
watered-down version of the bill because it
does not require training and testing. [A.
Inactive File]
AB 602 (Speier), as amended September 8, would authorize recovery of attorneys'
fees by a prevailing plaintiff in an action
to recover prescribed hospital, medical, or
disability benefits for a life-threatening
cancer condition; and make unenforceable
any contractual waiver of the right to
attorneys' fees under the bill. [S. Inactive
File]
AB 108 (Richter). Under existing law,
every pleading is required to be signed by
the party or his/her attorney. Existing law
authorizes every trial court to order a
party, the party's attorney, or both, to pay
any reasonable expenses, including
attorneys' fees, incurred by another party
as a result of bad faith actions or tactics,
as defined, that are frivolous or solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay, as
specified. As amended June 22, this bill
would provide as a pilot project applicable
only in Butte, San Diego, San Bernardino,
and Riverside counties, until January 1,
1998, unless that date is extended or deleted by later enacted legislation, that, except as specified, the signature of an attorney or party on any pleading, motion, and
any other paper filed or served in a civil
action, constitutes a certificate that he/she
has read the paper, has made a reasonable
inquiry into the allegations, and presents
it in good faith and not for an improper
purpose. The bill would require any pleading, motion, or other paper that is not
signed to be stricken unless it is promptly
signed after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or moving party.
The bill would require an appropriate
sanction to be imposed by the court if a
paper is signed in violation of these requirements. The bill would also require
the Judicial Council to conduct a specified
study of the pilot project and report its
findings to the Legislature on or before
January 1, 1997. [S. Jud]

AB 335 (Ferguson). Existing law authorizes the State Bar to establish and administer a minimum continuing legal education program. Existing law also exempts from this program retired judges,
officers and elected officials of the State
of California, full-time law professors,
and full-time employees of the state of
California, as specified. As amended June
9, this bill would delete the exemptions for
officers and elected officials of the state of
California. [S. Jud]
AB 500 (Goldsmith). Existing law
provides with respect to the settlement of
civil actions that, if an offer made by a
defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff
fails to obtain a more favorable judgment,
the plaintiff shall not recover his/her costs
and shall pay the defendant's costs from
the time of the offer. A similar provision,
at the discretion of the court, applies to
offers by a plaintiff which are not accepted
by the defendant. As amended June 8, this
bill would add reasonable attorneys' fees,
atthediscretion of thecourt, fromthe time
of the offer to the costs recoverable under
this provision, but these new provisions
would not apply to personal injury actions
in superior court. The bill would also authorize, in lieu of accepting a settlement
offer, an offeree to request binding arbitration which would, at the discretion of the
court, preclude the offeror from recovering attorneys' fees under the above provisions. [A. Jud]
AB 2302 (Morrow), as amended May
4, would require mandatory mediation in
certain civil actions upon the filing of a
request for mediation by a party against
whom a complaint or cross-complaint has
been filed, within thirty days of the latter
filing. [A. Jud]
AB 2300 (Morrow). Existing law authorizes, and in certain cases requires, the
courts to submit civil matters for arbitration by retired judges or licensed attorneys. Under these provisions of existing
law, the parties are entitled to a trial de
novo after arbitration, but, with certain
exceptions, are liable for specified costs of
the arbitration and prescribed expert witness fees, and may not recover costs as a
prevailing party, unless the party obtaining the trial de novo obtains a more favorable judgment, in either the amount
awarded or the type of relief granted, than
under the arbitration award. Under existing law, in superior courts with ten or more
judges where the amount in controversy,
in the opinion of the court, will not exceed
$50,000, the court is required to submit
the matter to this arbitration. Under existing law, other superior courts may provide
for submittal of these cases to this arbitration by local court rule where the amount
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in controversy, in the opinion of the court,
will not exceed $50,000. Under existing
law, in superior courts with fewer than ten
judges and which have not adopted such a
local rule, matters are required to be submitted to this arbitration if the plaintiff
files an election therefor and agrees that
the arbitration award shall not exceed
$50,000. As amended June 9, this bill
would, until January 1, 1996, increase the
above $50,000 maximums to $100,000.
IS. Judl
SB 102 (Lockyer). Existing law, as
determined by the California Supreme
Court in Neary v. Regents of University of
California, 3 Cal. 4th 273, authorizes an
appellate court to reverse a trial court
judgment upon the stipulation of the parties. As amended May 13, this bill would
specify that an agreement or stipulation of
the parties may not be the basis for reversing or vacating a judgment duly entered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, except upon a showing of substantial legal
or factual justification. The bill would declare agreements to the contrary to be violative of prescribed public policy, except
upon a showing of substantial legal or
factual justification. [A. Jud]
*

LITIGATION
On November 29, the U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari in Lawline v.
American Bar Association, et al., No.
93-529, thus leaving intact the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in the
case, 956 F.2d 1378 (1992). The complaint asserted antitrust and constitutional
challenges to two legal ethics rules recommended by the ABA and adopted by the
Illinois Supreme Court and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. Specifically, plaintiffs challenged
ABA Model Rule 5.4(b), which provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law," and Model Rule 5.5(b), which
states that "[a] lawyer shall not: assist a
person who is not a member of the bar in
the performance of activity that constitutes unauthorized practice of law."
[Editor's Note: The California Supreme
Court has adopted similar rules in California Rules of Professional Responsibility
1-3 10 and 1-300, respectively.]
Plaintiffs formed Lawline in 1978, an
unincorporated association of lawyers,
paralegals, and laypersons. Lawline operates a legal referral service to route lowincome members of the public who need
legal assistance to young lawyers who
charge reduced fees and to legal services
organizations, and to answer legal questions from the public without charge over
17
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the telephone to assist them in representing themselves in routine legal matters. In
February 1988, the U.S. Bankruptcy
Trustee complained to the Illinois Supreme Court's Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission that non-lawyers at Lawline were giving legal advice
to debtors in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. In response to the Trustee's filing of a motion in a bankruptcy proceeding to enjoin Lawline from engaging in the
practice of law in bankruptcy proceedings,
plaintiff Lawline and its principals filed
this action. Plaintiffs alleged that the two
ethics rules at issue are the result of a
conspiracy among the ABA House of Delegates, the Illinois State Bar Association
House of Delegates, and the Chicago Bar
Association to protect traditional law
firms and restrain trade; plaintiffs further
alleged a conspiracy among the three bar
associations, the Illinois federal court, the
Illinois Supreme Court, and the Illinois
State Bar to monopolize the dissemination
of legal advice in violation of the Sherman
Act and to deprive plaintiffs of their first
amendment, due process, and equal protection rights.
The Seventh Circuit found all defendants immune from federal antitrust liability under Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365
U.S. 127 (1961). As the disciplinary rules
at issue were adopted by the state and
federal courts in Illinois, Noerr's holding
that "[w]here a restraint upon trade or
monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private
action, no violation of the [Sherman] Act
can be made out" applies. The fact that the
defendant private bar associations may
have colluded to urge the courts to adopt
the rules is "immaterial," because Noerr
also states that "the Sherman Act does not
prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade
the legislature or the executive [here the
judiciary acting in a legislative capacity]
to take particular action with respect to the
law that would produce a restraint or monopoly."
On plaintiffs' constitutional challenges,
the court dismissed the private and federal
defendants, as plaintiffs had not demonstrated that they acted "under color of state
law." As to the remaining state defendants,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that, because the challenged rules do not draw a
suspect classification or infringe on a fundamental right, the state need only show
that its regulations are rationally related to
a legitimate state interest. "As the district
court explained, the two rules in question
meet this test because they are designed to
safeguard the public, maintain the integ-

rity of the profession, and protect the administration of justice from reproach" (citations omitted). The court found that
"[t]he partnership rule limitation promotes the independence of lawyers by preventing non-lawyers from controlling
how lawyers practice law. The regulation
attempts to minimize the number of situations in which lawyers will be motivated
by economic incentives rather than by
their client's best interests." As to the unauthorized practice rule, the court agreed
with the ABA that "[t]he prohibition
against the practice of law by a layman is
grounded in the need of the public for
integrity and competence of those who
undertake to render legal services." Although the Seventh Circuit noted that several prominent commentators disagree
with government prohibitions against unauthorized practice, it concluded that "the
state may choose any regulations that are
rational. When employing the appropriate
rational basis test, this Court does not require that the state choose the wisest policy, only that it choose a constitutional
one."
On November 30, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed to review the U.S. Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d
744 (1992). In this matter, FDIC-as receiver for a failed savings and loan institution-sued the law firm of O'Melveny
& Myers for professional negligence in
connection with the legal advice it provided to the institution. The principal activity of the S&L was the purchase, development, and sale of real estate partnerships sponsored by the S&L and its subsidiaries. These activities were funded by
the S&L's insured deposits, which totalled
$958 million in December 1985. In September 1985, the S&L retained O'Melveny
to prepare two "private placement memoranda" (PPMs)-documents designed to induce outside investors to become limited
partners in real estate deals sponsored by the
S&L. O'Melveny wrote substantial portions of the PPMs, edited other portions,
and performed a due diligence review to
confirm the accuracy and completeness of
the PPMs' disclosures. In preparing the
PPMs, O'Melveny apparently never communicated with the S&L's previous attorneys (which had determined that up-todate audited financial statements were
necessary for one of the real estate offerings at issue), two of its prior accountants
(who believed that the S&L's net worth
was less than zero), or the S&L's state and
federal regulators (who had been told by
the accountants of the S&L's precarious
financial condition). Although the parties
disagreed on several issues related to the

representations made in the PPMs, all parties agreed that the S&L's financial condition was far from sound, and that the
S&L's owners had intentionally and fraudulently overvalued the institution's assets,
engaged in the sham sale of the assets in
order to show inflated "profits," and "generally 'cook[ed] the books."'
In February 1986, FDIC concluded
that the S&L was insolvent, placed it in
receivership, and took over as receiver.
Five days later, FDIC filed a lawsuit
against the owners of the S&L, alleging
breach of fiduciary duty. FDIC also concluded that the PPMs were misleading,
and offered to have the partnerships that
controlled the two offerings rescind the
investments. In the offer of rescission,
each investor agreed to assign to FDIC "all
actions, causes of action, claims, or suits
of any kind or nature whatsoever against
any person or entity arising from the Initial
Offering....." Three years later, FDIC commenced this action against O'Melveny,
alleging professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.
In the district court, the parties agreed
to stipulate to a set of facts for purposes of
O'Melveny's motion for summary judgment. O'Melveny argued that it owed no
duty of care to the S&L or its affiliates
(including the investors) to ferret out the
owners' own fraud; the conduct of the
owners must be imputed to the institution,
and FDIC-as receiver-stands in the
shoes of the institution; and, as an ordinary
assignee, FDIC is barred from pursuing
any claims against O'Melveny. The district court granted O'Melveny's motion
for summary judgment.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, characterizing and rejecting O'Melveny's duty of
care argument as follows: "The Firm concedes the existence of a duty by aprincipal
and its agent of complete and accurate
disclosure to potential investors in a securities offering, but argues that the investors here have all been fully compensated,
and that the agent owes no additional duty
to the successor in interest of a principal
to make inquiries and disclose information which, the Firm argues, the principal
already knew and was trying to conceal.
In other words, O'Melveny contends that
the federal agency created by Congress to
rescue the economy and the victims of
failing thrifts can claim no stronger ethical
position than did the wrongdoers within
that corporate entity; that the government
agency is subject to all defenses that might
lie as between the wrongdoers themselves
and those who may have aided and abetted
them in bringing about the disaster. We
find such a proposition incredible, partic-
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ularly when applied to the duties of attorneys retained to give advice and assistance
with respect to public offerings."
Citing California caselaw and the
Rules of Professional Conduct, the court
found "a basic duty to give proper advice
to the client who is asking the public to
invest in its offering...," and moved to the
next question-"whether the attorneys are
absolved of that duty if there were wrongdoing officers inside the corporation." In
this regard, the court noted that a corporation is a distinct legal identity separate
from its owners, that-here-the corporation was O'Melveny's client (not the owners), and that the insider/wrongdoers were
"acting adversely" to the corporation
(such that the misconduct of the officers is
not attributable to the corporation now
represented by FDIC). The court then rejected the application of "well-established
California law" ("a receiver occupies no
better position than that which was occupied by the party for whom he acts.. rind
any defense good against the original
party is good against the receiver"), finding that "[i]t is now clear beyond doubt
that federal, not state, law governs the
application of defenses against FDIC.
Thus, contrary to O'Melveny's argument,
we are not bound by state law, but must
instead establish federal law."
In fashioning a federal rule of decision,
the court noted that a receiver, "like a
bankruptcy trustee and unlike a normal
successor in interest, does not voluntarily
step into the shoes of the bank; it is thrust
into those shoes. It was neither a party to
the original inequitable conduct nor is it in
a position to take action prior to assuming
the bank's assets to cure any associated
defects or force the bank to pay for incurable defects....Also significant is the fact
that the receiver becomes the bank's successor as part of an intricate regulatory
scheme designed to protect the interests of
third parties who also were not privy to the
bank's inequitable conduct. That scheme
would be frustrated by imputing the
bank's inequitable conduct to the receiver ...
Inlight of these considerations,
we conclude that the equities between a
party asserting an equitable defense and a
bank are at such variance with the equities
between the party and a receiver of the
bank that equitable defenses good against
the bank should not be available against
the receiver. To hold otherwise would be
to elevate form over substance-something courts sitting in equity traditionally
will not do." The Ninth Circuit found that
O'Melveny owed a duty of care to its
corporate client and that there are genuine
issues of material fact as to whether that
duty was discharged; the case was re-

versed and remanded back to the district
court for further proceedings.
In petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court
for review, O'Melveny's attorneys argued
that the Ninth Circuit's application of federal common law and apparent creation of
the new federal tort of malpractice was
improper and that state tort law applies;
that its interpretation of an attorney's duty
of care creates a "duty to the world" which
will forever alter the way lawyers and
other professionals must deal with corporate clients; and that its decision dangerously preempts the authority of states to
regulate the practice of law and the attorney-client relationship. At this writing, the
Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral
argument in the case in March.
In Howardv. Babcock, 6 Cal. 4th. 409
(Dec. 6, 1993), the California Supreme
Court affirmed the validity of a non-competition clause in a law firm partnership
agreement. Under the clause which was
upheld as enforceable, the partners of the
former Orange County firm of Parker,
Stanbury, McGee, Babcock & Combs
agreed that if more than one of them withdrew from the partnership prior to age 65
and within one year established with others (including other departing members of
the Parker firm) a practice engaged in the
handling of liability insurance defense
work within Los Angeles or Orange counties, the departing partners would forfeit
their withdrawal benefits. After the firm
split up and the departing members established a new firm in Orange County handling insurance defense cases, litigation
ensued. The trial court upheld the validity
of the non-competition clause, but the
Fourth District reversed, citing Rule of
Professional Conduct 1-500, which precludes any private agreement which restricts the right of a member of the State
Bar from practicing law. In light of the fact
that the Fourth District's decision conflicted with the Second District's decision
in Haight v. SuperiorCourt, 234 Cal. App.
3d 963 (1991), the California Supreme
Court agreed to review the case. [12:4
CRLR 238; 12:2&3 CRLR 271]
The Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth District's decision, noting that
Business and Professions Code section
16602 permits reasonable non-competition clauses under certain circumstances.
In this case of first impression interpreting
the applicability of section 16602 to the
legal profession, the court analyzed section 16602 and found no ambiguity in the
terms of the statute, nothing in the express
language of the statute which precludes its
application to law firms, and nothing in
the legislative history of the statute to indicate the legislature's intent to preclude
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its application to law firms. As to Rule
1-500, the court stated: "We are not persuaded that this rule was intended to or
should prohibit the type of agreement that
is at issue here. An agreement that assesses
a reasonable cost against a partner who
chooses to compete with his or her former
partners does not restrict the practice of
law. Rather, it attaches an economic consequence to a departing partner's unrestricted choice to pursue a particular kind
of practice." The court recognized "sweeping changes in the practice of law," including "the propensity of withdrawing partners in law firms to 'grab' clients of the
firm and set up a competing practice," and
the decline of "institutional loyalty"
within once-stable law firms, and stated
that "we can see no legal justification for
treating partners in law firms differently in
this respect from partners in other businesses and professions." The Supreme
Court remanded the case to the trial court
for a determination whether the agreement
was "reasonable."
In McEldowney v. National Conference of BarExaminers, No. CV-93-3146AWT (C.D. Cal., Nov. 15, 1993), unsuccessful Bar exam applicant James Kenneth McEldowney sued NCBE, the private organization which prepares and
grades the multistate portion of the State
Bar exam. Plaintiff alleged that his exam
failure was due to NCBE's recognition of
answers other than the ones chosen by
plaintiff as correct on "one or more" questions on the multistate exam. Plaintiff filed
the lawsuit after unsuccessfully petitioning both the State Bar and NCBE for redress.
McEldowney's complaint alleged both
negligence and breach of an asserted
third-party beneficiary contract between
the NCBE and the State Bar, and sought
only damages. After denying NCBE's motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of subject matterjurisdiction and absolute quasijudicial immunity (on the latter issue, the
court rejected NCBE's argument that it
should be entitled to the same immunity
as enjoyed by the State Bar, finding that
NCBE's administrative role of drafting
and grading an exam is no more "judicial"
than "a law school professor who is paid
$100 for writing an essay questions for the
bar examination"), the court found
plaintiff's negligence claim barred by the
one-year statute of limitations. The court
also dismissed the breach of contract
claim, finding that plaintiff is not a thirdparty beneficiary of the contract between
NCBE and the State Bar. "The NCBE
correctly contends that the purpose of the
bar examination, and the [multistate
exam] as a part of that examination, is to
17
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protect the public. It has no purpose or
function of conferring any benefit on any
person who sits for the examination."
Thus, the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
In Attorney General Opinion No. 93416 (Sept. 17, 1993), Attorney General
Dan Lungren concluded that the powers
granted to a non-lawyer agent under a
statutory form power of attorney under
Civil Code section 2494 do not permit the
non-lawyer agent to practice law without
a license in violation of Business and Professions Code section 6125. Section 2494,
part of the Uniform Statutory Form Power
of Attorney Act, sets forth precise powers
granted for a variety of specified categories, one of which is for "claims and litigation." In determining whether the provisions of section 2494 constitute an exception to the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, the AG distinguished between acting as an "attorney in
fact" and acting as an "attorney at law."
Using a power of attorney, a person may
appoint an agent to do the same acts and
achieve the same legal consequences by
the performance of an act as if he had acted
personally; "the person holding a power
of attorney is known and designated as an
'attorney in fact,' thus distinguishing such
person from an attorney at law." Looking
at the plain language of section 2494, the
AG noted that "the powers specified therein
allow the agent to bind the principal in legal
matters pertaining to claims and litigation;
whatever legal posture could be assumed by
the principal, the agent may also assume on
his or her behalf. however, none of the enumerated powers necessarily entails the practice of law as that term has been defined by
the courts, and nothing in the language ofthe
statute allows the agent to undertake such
functions as preparing legal pleadings and
arguing matters before a judge or jury" (citation omitted).
The AG also noted constitutional and
policy reasons supporting its conclusion.
Specifically, the AG stated that interpreting section 2494 so as to allow the unlicensed practice of law would permit the
legislature to dictate minimum standards
for engaging in the practice of law-a
power constitutionally reserved to the
California Supreme Court. The AG also
noted that if a power of attorney could
authorize the practice of law by an unlicensed person, disbarred persons and others who have failed to pass the bar examination would be able to "hire themselves
out on a part-time basis to a number of
[clients], creating a cadre of unprofessional practitioners" (citation omitted).
At the end of the opinion, the AG noted
that a person may prepare legal pleadings
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and briefs and represent himself in propria
persona; however, this activity is not
properly considered "the practice of law"
since there is no relationship with a client
and no rendering of legal advice. Without
so stating, the AG implied that a statutorily-empowered agent ("attorney in fact")
may stand in the shoes of an in pro per
principal without violating Business and
Professions Code section 6125, because in
pro per representation is not "the practice
of law."
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FUTURE MEETINGS
May 13-14 in San Francisco.
June 17-18 in San Francisco.
July 22-23 in Los Angeles.
August 26-27 in San Francisco.
September 22-24 in Anaheim (annual
meeting).
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